

*Dulles as DCI*

SECRET

10 Feb 1953

Sen. Saltonstall (new chair, following 1952 elections) agreed that it might be best to appoint a special subcomm for handling CIA matters, as Sen. Russell had originally done, and asked that Pforz. 'keep after him to appoint such a group.'

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Feb 10, 1953--Dulles pays courtesy call on Chairmen Saltonstall and Short and discussed w/ Saltonstall the procedures to be followed for confirmation.

Both chairmen were advised of the legislative prob arising out of the need for speical legislaton to permit Gen. Cabell to assume the DDCI w/out loss of his mil. status.

19 Feb--Dulles appears before Senate ArmSerComm, which unanimously recommended his confirmation

23 Feb--Senate unanimously confirms him as DCI by voice vote

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19 Feb 1953

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Dulles appeared before Senate ArmServComm for confirmation. Present were Sens. Saltonstall, Flanders, Smith, Duff, Sternis, and Symington, who all joined in praising the nominee and asked no Qs. Comm. unanimously confirmed Dulles.

*Senate unanimously confirmed Dulles by voice vote on 23 Feb.*

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UNCLASSIFIED

"During the yrs 1953 to 1961 the Agency emerged as an integral element in high-level United States policymaking."

p. 42

[use this as leadin to fact that little effective cong. oversight existed]

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SECRET

10 June 1953

meeting w/ Chairman Taber and staffer Sprankle of House Appro Comm. Taber expressed some disturbance at size and trend of CIA build-up, and found it difficult to accept necessity of continued increased in personnel. Sprankle expressed concern on ration of personnel people to total personnel, which is out of line w/ normal govt agencies. Taber complained that the hearings had not given much of a breakdown on the CIA, altho this may have been the fault as much of the congressional questioners as of CIA's reluctance to share info.

Taber requested that we leave our figures w/ them and if we refused, he would be forced to leave the money out of the appropriation. He had obviously forgotten the agreement w/ DCI that we would produce the book on request but keep it at CIA. But later he backed down on his request. "It is apparent that Congressman Taber was extremely tired and that he has forgotten a good many of the imp matters which we discussed at our hearings in justifying the CIA budget. We have an impression that he would like to make some cuts in the appropriation but, because of the nature of our organization, does not know where the cuts should be made. He definitely does not wish to be arbitrary and reiterates his desire not to hurt us in any of our work."

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29 June 1953 -- House Appro

Comm has reported out the CIA budget w/ approxi. a 20% cut in substantive budget and no cut in reserve. They have informed BOB that no increases in personnel over 1953 numbers are to be allowed.

Sprankle told me that in his opinion the budget presentation had been extremely confusing and had presented a hodge-podge of info which was further confused by the charts

*[Senate subsequently votes these same figures, but w/out the personnel limitation]*

28 July 1953 -- DCI tals w/ Taber re the personnel ceiling which the latter had imposed on CIA. Taber "denied any knowledge of such a ceiling or any intention to impose such a limitation upon CIA." Sprankle then called into the meeting and shows Taber the letter he had sent. The matter has now been left open for discussion w/ BOB.

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~~31~~ Aug 1953 - BOB authorizes *"somewhat less than"*   additional positions over 1953 figures

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12 March 1953

DCI and WLP appeared before Senate ARmSercomm in support of S. 1110.

the comm. accepted a Def. Dept amendment (not sure which one--perhaps one to not include a mil. DDCI in the # of general offaicers allotted to each service--chk. this out) The bill unanimously approved w/ mendments suggested by CIA which would permit DDCI to be either an active or retired commissioned officer.

The comm. amended the bill to have the DDCI confirmed by the Senate but did not push a suggestion of Sen. Saltonstall that if either the DCI or DDCI were a mil man the other office must be held by a civilian.

*Senate passed S. 1110 on 18 March*

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entries for 26 and 27 March 1953

w/ prodding from the White House, House ArmServComm unanimously approved the bill to estab a DDCI by striking out everything after the enacting clause in S. 1110 and substituting the language of H.R. \$\$\$\$. This will make it possible for eht Senate to accept the bill on the floor w/out referral to committee or going to conf.

28 Mar 1953

Repre. McCormack, talking of DDCI bill, assured me that he had ~~xxxx~~ backed the measure and pushed it "'particularly for you' in view of our long association in many matters."

*final congression approval on 1 april - P.L. 15, 83<sup>rd</sup> Cong.*

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CIA requested legislation to amend 1947 act to authroize appointment of DDCI. This bill became P.L. 15 on Apr 4, 1953.

also in P.L. 763 (1 Sept 1954), CIA requested and received exemption from Performance Rating Act o f 1950 and repealed Sec. 9 of CIA ACT of 1949 which was no longer required by Agency.

also a section to provide for handling of for. atomic energy info included in Atomic Energy Act of 1954 at CIA request.

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Apr. 4, 1953 - Sec. 102 of Nat. Sec. Act amended to prohibit  
the 2 positions of DCI & DDCI from being occupied simultaneously  
by <sup>mil</sup>commissioned officers, either in active or retired status

DDCI to be appointed by Pres, by & w/ the advice & consent of Senate

text of act: 67 Statutes-at-Large 19-20

[see Cong. Rec., vol. 99, p. 2645 for debate]

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[I am not certain abt the following, which comes from penciled draft in some of the OLC materials in HS vault. Chk further before using]

until appt. of Dulles in 1953 as DCI, CIA had always had a mil. officer as Director. Becuz certain phases of CIA work entered into the mil filed, and becuz the mil supplied a gr. deal of support to Agency activities, it was felt desirable to have a mil. officer in one of the two top positons of the Agency.

Ike appted Lt. Gen. Cabell of the Air Force as DDCI under the Executive Pay Act of 1949, but there was no provision of law under which a commissioned or retired officer could be appointed to this position

Senate ArmSevComm made several changes to S. 1110 as it was introduced

1. DDCI needed Senate approval
2. DDCI, if a commissioned officer of the armed services, permitted to be either active or retired
3. any mil DDCI was to be "in addition to the no. and percentages otherwise authorized and appropriated for the armed service of which he is a member."

OVER

*which had  
extended a  
salary for the  
position*

House ARMSerCommdecided to strike out all language in S. 1110 and substitute its own wording as contained in H.R. 4224. This to avoid need for conf. comm.

House Comm.(?) decreed that at no time could both DCI and DDCI be mil. personnel

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30 March 1953

clerk of Senate ArmServComm tells me that chairman Saltonstall feels that any CIA briefing to members of his comm should be by invitation of the DCI and be limited to himself, Bridges, and Russell. "It was felt that any attempt to go further down the Comm line might be embarrassing in view of the neccessity from a practical standpt



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Pforzheimer Memo for Chief, FI, April 1, 1953, Subj:  
Proposed Directive on Release of Information

informal arrangement w/ McCarran whereby CIA provides Sen  
Jud Comm w/ classified memo for backgrd info, 1949-53

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unsigned, undated [prior to Dulles' confirmation] memo entitled  
"Armed Services Committees" [Apr '53?]

CONFIDENTIAL

desc. of the 2 armed Services committeess , their workings, and  
their personnel

*info on CIA subcom of Senate ArmSecComm.*

TOP SECRET

Questions Asked at the Budget Hearing Before the House Appropriations Committee, 29 Apr 1953

Rep. Errett (?) P. Scrivner, Repub. of Kansas, obviously unahppy at Dulles and CIA.

"Mr. Scrivner proceeded to say that he had one or two other things he wanted to get off his chest. He said that it had been his understanding from the geginning that CIA was to be a small, well-knit coordinating agency which wuld save vast sums of money and would eliminate all of the duplication from other depts. Insofar as he could see, most depts were still carrying on as they had been before and CIA was getting to be a great big, expensive organization. He indicated that CIA had been supported pretty much on faith but that now it was developing into a good-sized Govt dept w/out any corresponding decreases elsewhere. It seemed to him that maybe we had evern developed another layer. He said that he was not happy abt the situation and had some reservations as to whether or not the taxpayers were getting their money's worth for the CIA dollar. He further stated that he considered himself to be as honest and tight-lipped as anybody and that he had gone along w/ our appropriations heretofore on faith. However, he felt that if he could not be trusted w/ the detailed info as to where our money went, etc., that he could hardly be called upon to discharge his obligations to the Amer taxpayers as to whether or not our money was reasonable. He indicated that at some time somebody was

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TOP SECRET

going to have to examine our results to determine whether the taxpayers were getting their money's worth and emphasized that he was not impressed by the fact that we had indicated that the Russians were spending many times the amt of money that we were.

"Mr. Scrivner went on to say that he was not convinced that the programs which we were undertaking were successfully combatting the other side and that he did not believe that he should be called upon as a member of the ~~SENATE~~ Committee to 'shoot in the dark.' (Mr. Dulles invited Mr. Scrivner to come down to CIA when he could spare the time and give us an opportunity to show him in greater detail some of the things we are doing.)"

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5 May 1953

Dulles talked w/ Rep. Taber and reached an agreement whereby CIA would supply the info requested but would not leave it w/ the Comm. [ ] will be assigned to bring it up whenever the comm. staff desires it and will return it each time to CIA.

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5 June 1953

In commention w/ the memo, dated 20 May 1953, from Mr. [ ] Special Assis to the DD/A: Subj: Regulation [ ] Disclosures to the United States Cong, and w/ Kirkpatrick's approval, I am requesting [ ] to w/hold reissuance of this reg until adjournment of Cong and an opportunity to review the reg at length.

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8 June 1953 -- [ ] Acting AD/00. called to complain abt delaying a redraft of CIA Reg [ ] as he feels that a firm reg is needed at once to prevent the disclosure of info to congressional comms. I informed him that he has no need for concern, as there will be no disclosures w/out the expressed approval of the DCI and that, in my opinion, there was no need at present time to rush out a redraft of the reg.

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13 July 1953 - Sen. Monroney makes speech on Floor  
urging Senate not to permit investigation of CIA

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12 Aug 1953 -- I called Cong. Cole at his hom in NY and informed him that CIA desired to send him some info by courier and would meet him at any designated address. After further discussion (the memo does not reveal the nature of the info to be imparted), Cole replied he might not be able to make any decisions away from Wash and would return to Wash on the night train.

13 Aug 1953 -- Gen. Cabell and I went to see Cole and gave him a document, which he read, signed and returned. Cole stated that he felt it was incomubent to disclose the info to Sen. Hickenlooper, the Comm. vice chairman, and I offered to do this. Cole replied he felt it preferable to do it himself, as ther might be some Q if at a futute date if became known that CIA had merely selected 2 members to receive this info. Later it was ascertained that Hickenlooper out of town, so Cole told CIA to pass the info along.

[no direct reference to the subj matter involved, but I feel sure it deals w/ KHbomb. I think Rus exploede it on Aug 12 and announced it on Aug 20, but chk. Cabell testified before Jt Comm on Atomic E on Aug. 21 on this subj]

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15 Sept 1953 - OLC Tamm mentions  
"Kirkpatrick's proposed report to the Director on Legislative  
Lesson." - on 15 Sept, OLC receives it for comment

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brief flurry involving Mr. Flanagan, Counsel to Senate  
Comm. on Int. Operations, ~~re~~ centering around "the

matter". See OLC Journal, Oct. 3-Oct. 7  
1953 if interested. No notes taken. On basis of what  
I know now, this is unimp, but further research may  
suggest the need to go back & get these notes.

+ Oct. 15, 19, 22

ILLEGIB

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12 Oct 1953

in accordance w/ DCI's decision, I have informed staff of  
Jt Comm on Atomic E that CIA feels it cannot check comm  
quarters on Capitol Hill for possible microphones becuz  
of our statutory prohibition vs. internal security funcs.

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28 Oct 1953 -- in course of briefing by DCI, Francis O. Wilcox, of staff of Senate For Rel Comm, expressed his regret that the Comm on For Rel does not have access to any CIA info, which he felt would ve extremely helpful to the Com

DCI pted out that he was the intell advisor to the Pres and NSC, and had resisted the idea of being intell advisor to congressional committeess (other than Jt Comm on Atomic E) as this would tend to present a good many difficulties. DCI mentioned in particular that he might be placed in ~~the~~ an embarrassing position by such comms attempting to utilize the info in the formulation of appropriations for various agencies

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19 Nov 1953 -- it is reported that there was some light  
grumbling abt CIA on the Hill during the past session,  
largely on the basis that "We don't know what they are doing;  
we ought to take a look at them." Some of the grumbling  
apparently came from Appro Comm members

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8 Jan 1954 -- Cong. Judd concerned abt derogatory reports of CIA. He said these were natural in view of our security probs and the fact that comparatively few people knew abt us. He stated it would be very helpful if CIA had a Jt Comm on Intell whose members could come to our defense where necessary, indicating tht they had looked into specific complaints and situations, as is done w/ AEC. He is concerned lest these remarks damage the Agecny.

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Pforzheimer Memorandum for the Director, 13 Jan 1954, Subj: luncheon  
w/ Sen. Saltonstall

"the most imp. prob on Capitol Hill insofar as CIA is concerned  
is that we do not have any official spokesman or persons who can  
come to our defense either on the Floor or, more important, in  
the Cloak Rooms where so much discussion takes place."

the most general complaint abt CIA is that no one on Capitol Hill  
knows abt CIA, its size, budget, or activities.

a possible solution to these 2 probs: have the ArmSer Comms "assert  
a more active jurisdiction over CIA," esp. since the ArmSerComms  
are resp for our legislation. If Saltonstall [chair, ArmSerComm]  
could be persuaded to set up "a special subcomm which could take  
periodic looks at CIA, whose members would be in a position to defend  
us where necessary, and to which subcomm any complaints could be  
channeled, it might serve to ease the Congressional prob and also  
obviate the necessity for a Jt Comm"

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15 Jan 1954 -- Robt Smart, Chief Clerk of House ArmSercomm indicated this would not be a good yr to bring up CIA legislation becuz 1) of the general difficulties of the congressional program in an election yr, and 2) becuz of an undertow of Qs re CIA, not all of them hostile, but at least indicating a deisre to know more abt CIA. It might be difficult to turn aside such Qs if legislative requirements were put forward.

Smart volunteered his opinion that the ArmSerComm, thru a specially and highly selected subc omm, might be an appropriate group to look at CIA. He emphasized that no one at present could properly answer any Qs abt CIA or come to our defense. Smart stated: 'I don't have to tell you that the best defesne is a good offense, and it might be very wise for Mr. Dulles to say to the Chairman at their luncheon that he would welcome any look which the Comm might wish to make.' Smart thought that the best approach would be to have the Chairman appoint a 3 or 5 man subcomm, preferably consisting of the chairman, Vinson, and Cole.

23 JAN - DCI tells Tudd that he (DCI) attempting to have Arm Ser Comm take jurisdiction, in lieu of Jt. Comm.

Over

25 JAN 1954 - DCI talks w/ Chairman Dewey Short of House Arm Sec Com  
Re port of a JT Comm + the possibility that Short might designate a  
subcomm. No commitments given, but Short appears extremely friendly to  
CIA.

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*oversight*  
18 Jan 1954 -- Sen. Saltonstall lunched w/ DCI and other senior CIA officers. DCI expressed some concern that CIA was becoming the object of attacks on the Hill due to Senators not knowing abt the Agency; perhaps Saltonstall should set up a subcomm to acquaint itself w/ our activities.

Saltonstall said he had not heard much adverse criticism; that if properly handled a Jt Comm could be avoided; and that he would tend to want to let 'sleeping dogs lie' and not create any subcomm.

*McCarthy*  
Saltonstall also advised vs discussing CIA w/ members of McCarthy's subcomm w/out including McCarthy as if would certainly get back to him. He advised us to invite McCarthy to lunch to see what he might have.

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if it turns out that John V. Grombach becomes imp for my story, there is a memo abt him covering the period June 1953-May 1954 in item 2 of the collection of documents sent HS by OLC in early 1982, and presently stored in HS vault.

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unlike many yrs, Cong granted the Pres's full request for CIA budget. But Ike had requested only the same figure that Cong. had authorized the preceding yr.

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but Cong did take a new action this yr. In testitfing before House Appro. Comm in March 1954, Dulles proposed that the reserve fund be appropriated on a no-yr. basis, and that the unobligated balance be carried over each yr.

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pp. 78-79

SECRET

5 Mar 1954 -- A bill introduced in the Senate to require the text of any international agreement other than treaties entered into by US be transmitted to Senate w/in 30 days of its execution. This could cause some prob in the case of any secret agreements re intell activities or support (it is not imp. what happens to this bill. The imp. thing for my purposes is the natural clash of priorities inherent in the relationship)

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8 Mar 1954

Manafield introduces a new version of ~~the~~ his bill to estab. a  
jit. comm. on intell., including certain revisions arising from conversations  
w/ DCI. In particular, the # of members has been reduced to 10  
to meet objections abt. size

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OLC Journal, 12 March 1954

Gen. Mudge of the Senate ArmSerComm staff, called to say that DCI at the 22 March meeting w/ the committee should take the initiative to rebut the statements contained in Sen. Mansfield's speech. The Comm preferred this rather than a briefing on the world situation.

OLC JOURNAL, 22 Mar 54--SECRET

DCI attended a session of special subcomm of Seante ArmServComm to brief them on CIA activities, w/ speical emphasis on the attacks on CIA contained in Sen. Mansfield's speech to the Senate on 10 March. Present were Chairman Saltonstall, Russel, Byrd, and Flanders See Memo for Record dated 25 March

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12 Mar. 54

OLC Journal refers to a recent speech by Sen. Mansfield on CIA  
(the NYT index or Cong. Rec. for this) <sup>Mar. 10 - speech to the Senate</sup>

DCI is to meet w/ Senate Arms Sec. Comm. on 22 March & shall  
try to rebut Mansfield's statements

22 Mar. - DCI briefs special subcomm. of Senate Arms Sec. Comm., w/ special  
emphasis on Mansfield's attacks - Presenters: Chauncey Saltzman, Russell,  
Byrd, & Flanders - Sen. Bridges invited but unable to attend

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SECRET

Memo for the Record, by L.K. White (acting DD/A), 23 Mar 54,  
Subj: Conference w/ Mr. Taber, Concerning the CIA Budget Presentation  
for Fiscal Year 1955

follow up to White memo of 23 Mar, also exeroxed

*security prob. in briefing Cong.*



budget hearings and security

*CONFIDENTIAL*

Memo for the Record, by L.K. White (Acting DD/A), 23 Mar 54,  
Subj: Presentation to the House Appropriations Comm of the CIA  
Budget for Fiscal Year 1955

*probs re security of records given Cong.*

in the OLC Journal entry of 23 Mar, same file, we learn that  
Dulles and Col. White meet w/ Taber in the latter's office.  
Subsequently Pforz informs Sprankle that the special black books  
would be delivered to him at 0900 on 24 Mar per Taber's instructions.  
Sprankle stated that there was no pt in delivering the books  
then, as it would be too late for the staff to study them.

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SECRET

Pforzheimer Memo for the Record, 1 Apr 1954, Subj: Appearance  
of the DCI before a Subcomm of the Senate ArmSerComm

report of DCI's appearance before subcomm on 22 March, rebutting  
Mansfield's attack

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OLC Journal, 24 Mar 1954

budget presentation before House Appropriations Comm for f.y. 1955. Col. White deliverd copy of CIA appropriations black book to Mr. Sprankle of the comm. staff at 0900. Sprankle "kept them waiting some period of time and then siad he did not have time to go through the book then and that it should be taken to the hearing room." Copies made available to comm. members thruout the briefing.

briefing opened by a lengthy statement and Q-and=answer session w/ Dulles. During session, both Chairman Taber and Mr. Cannon commented on need for secrecy and security. There were 11 congressmen present, plus 5 staffers and a court reporter.

the hearings turned to qs on Sov. atomic development. After answeeing several Qs, DCI stated he felt he should not pursue theis subj any further w/out approval of Jt. Congressional Comm on A. Energy.-- in part by necessity for "Q" clearances. Taber backs him on this.

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Jt. Comm undertook a complete revision of the Atomic E.  
Act of 1946--P.L. 703

Lengthy discussion bet. CIA and AEC to reach language  
which would give CIA greater latitude in the development  
and exchange of intell in field of for. atomic e.  
This language thn redrafted by staff of Jt. Comm and  
becamd Sec. 142 (e) of the new act.

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23 Feb 1954 -- staff of Sen ArmServComm asked for info re the existence of 2 heavy Soviet bombers which were the subj of newspaper articles on 15 Feb. Robert Sprague, Special Consultant to the Comm, desires ~~this info~~ our evaluation of these aircraft (range, ceiling, speed) if they in fact exist. At present Air Force is carrying the ball for the intell. community in evaluating these reports, so I recommended that Sprague call Gen. Samford, Air Force Dir. of Intell.

*24 Feb '54 - DCI talked w/ Sprague re Sov. aircraft*

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Memo for the Record, by Robert Amory (DD/I), 1 Apr 54

Rep. Scrivner, chairman of Air Force Subcomm of House Army Navy Appropriations Subcomm., asked for info re heavy Sov. Bombers. Pforzheimer and Amory call upon him and give him a briefing, suggesting that recent photos of Sov bombers in Aviation Weekly were not authentic.

Helped him draw up a statement which he might give during floor debate to counter attacks on Air Force budget based on possible existence of these planes.

Scrivner grateful for the briefing and appreciative of fact that he could come to us for this info.

subsequently, on Apr 28, 1954 (p. 5373 in CR), Scrivner gave a speech the general tenor of which was that US remains well ahead of Sov in no. and quality of aircraft.

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SECRET

2 April 1954 -- re a conversation Sen. Mansfield allegedly had w/ a Washington attorney, which has been passed on to us. Mansfield claims he has no ulterior motives and doesn't care even whetehr he is on the comm. But he did feel that if he did not introduce his resolution, someone wlse w-uld and itaculd be worse than the Mansfield version (presumedly worse for CIA). Mansfield feels the resolution will not get anywhere, at least at this session of Con. Also feels that possibly the best comm wuld be one composed of the vice president, the Speaker, and the Majority and Minority Leaders.

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OLC ~~Journal~~ Daily Log

SECRET

8 April 1954

Corbin Allerdice of Jt Comm on AtEn called to say that the security of the comm. rooms had not been checked for some time for microphones, etc., and would CIA desire to check them before their appearance on 13 Apr? I replied that in view of our statutory prohibitions, it would be improper for us to check the rooms

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Pforzheimer Memorandum for the Record, 13 Apr 1954, Subj: Conversation w/ Cong. McCormack



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OLC Journal, 27 May 1954

Senate Rules Comm met on 26 May to consider S. Con. Res. 69.  
Saltonstall appeared before Rules Comm.  
Rules Comm has taken no action yet.

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SECRET

25 May 1954 -- WLP talked w/ Frank Schroeder, of the staff of the Senate immigration Subcomm, who tells me that the task force is continuing to study the Guatemalan and Latin Amer situation thru the medium of staff conferences rather than sworn testimony. They are anxious to do nothing "to upset the apple cart at this time."

28 May 1954 -- DCI meeting w/ Congressman Kersten. Kersten says he had discussed w/ V.P. Nixon the possibility that upon its return from Eur, the Comm might go into the prob of Communist aggression in Guatemala. Kersten says Nixon looked upon the matter w/ some favor, but felt that the timeing was wrong and perhaps Kersten should talk w/ DCI. DCI agreed that the timing was bad, esp. for comm members to visit Guatemala, but pted out that the situation was now passing from the covert to the overt or diplomatic stage.

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SECRET

7 June 1954 -- perhaps a feud bet the Jenner and Kersten  
c omms over jurisdiction for hearings on Guatemala.  
The Jenner Comm has not held hearings at the request  
of the White House "because of the ticklish situation  
at present in Latin Amer." But now we learn that Cong.  
Hillings has recently visited Guatemala for the Kersten  
Comm.

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Pforzheimer Memorandum for the Record, Subj: Conversation w/ Charles P. Grimes, 15 June 1954

Grimes is the just resigned Chief Counsel to the Senate Internal & Security Subcomm.

Grimes recounts the suspicions of CIA in his committee, fostered by the lack of senatorial knowledge of an organization which allegedly spends huge sums w/out detailed accountability to Cong. Sens. Welker and McCarran are quite hostile.

"Grimes pts out the inevitable hostility engendered in the minds of the right-wing and mid-Western Republicans because of their feeling that CIA is predominantly Eastern and dominated by the Dewey-Dulles clique. This suspicion is so deep-seated that it will be virtually impossible to dispel w/ a person such as Senator Welker."

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SECRET

22 June 1954 -- Robert Kennedy, Minority Counsel for Senate Investigations Subcomm again expressed his concern as to how CIA was to meet cong. suspicions which have been expressed. He wondered if a jt. comm. similar to Jt Atomic E. Comm would not be the answer. I explained to him the difference bet our situation and that of the AEC--that they had 20 pieces of legislation to our one; the vast diversity of AEC probs, including preemptive rights, etc. I also mentioned that ArmSerComm had jurisdiction which could be exercised. He pted out the obvious fact that they had not exercised that jurisdiction in any gr. detail. His parting comment was that CIA would be in troublt if we didn't win the war in Guatemala. A few minutes later I ran into Don Durine, who remarked that we seem to be doing very well w/ the war in Guatemala.

*Guatemala*

SECRET

24 June 1954 -- Comptroller tells me that the completed action of the Defense Appropriations bill has left CIA budget unchanged, and that SEnate Appro Comm has used the identical language w/ House Comm in authorizing our funds, including those available on a "no yr" basis. He also states that Chairmen Taber and Bridges have initialed off on a special project involving transfer of funds for which their approval had been requested.

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1. Continued cong inquiries re Radio Free Eur., allegations of some CIA links w/ RFE, + duplication of effort bet. RFE + Voice of Amer.
  2. cong. comms investigating refugee organizations constantly threatened to bump into covert CIA operations
  3. handling requests for briefings by congressmen abt. to go overseas
  4. handling printer bills
  5. trade down + defuse erroneous rumors abt CIA
  6. cong. inquiries resulting from constituent mail - may deal w/ laws such as CIA employees for ~~non-support~~ failure to pay alimony or child support; or concern from parents who have not heard from a child working overseas for CIA.
  7. personnel probs - hiring new employees sponsored by congressmen - or handling ~~comp~~ complaints carried to order congressmen by disgruntled former employees
  8. cong. requests to other agencies for appropriate info, which threaten to expose CIA activities
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- 9) cong. requests for info
  - 10) luncheon w/ cong. & their staffs
  - 11) following legislation thru Cong. which pertains primarily to the agencies to insure CIA personalities not impinged upon
  - 12) working on drafts of bills
  - 13) numerous inquiries re defectors from Sov. bloc
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SECRET

15 July 1954 -- immediately after this morning's meeting of House Comm on Post Office & Civil Service, Chairman Rees called to say that they had taken care of inserting in the bill the 2 items CIA wanted--exemption from the Performance Rating Act, and deletion of Sec 9 of P.L. 110.

Senate has not yet considered this bill

*Aug. 12 - Senate approves - Cong. conf. comm. then OKs*

*Sec. 7 - provided by for 3 special slots for scientific intell; no longer needed because of increase in federal wage scales*

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1 Sept 54 - at CIA request, 2 provisions exempted CIA  
from Performance Rating Act of 1950, & repealed Sec. 9 of the  
CIA Act of 1949, which was no longer required by CIA

the act as a whole provided certain employment benefits for  
federal employees

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SECRET

4 Aug 1954 -- Julius Cahn, Counsel to Senate ForRelComm, noted theat many times CIA is attacked w/out a chance for defense. He stated that Chairman Wiley would be glad any time at our request to propound a mutually agreeable series of Qs and answers which might be helpful to CIA in a given indicent, as suggested the case of [redacted] as a case in pt.

After thanking him for the offer, I told him that we felt that SenArmServComm had a strong jurisdiction in matters of the kind

25X1  
29X1

SECRET

12 Aug 1954 -- WLP is advising certain steps to inform key congressmen abt matters in which they may have an interest. He then adds: "These small attentions are usually highly appreciated by senior members of the Cong who often feel that the Admin does not pay them sufficient attention."

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24 Sept 1954 -- a review of congressional contacts by this office during the 83rd Cong (1 Jan 1953-1 Sept 1954) indicates that we have been incontact w/ 84 senators and 257 congressmen or their offices on various matters, including comm briefings, personnel applications, general inquiries, and the like. During this period, there have been 271 job applications from congressional sources, of whom 32 have been hired. This is almost 5% of the congressional applicants, a figure almost identical w/ the overall Agency percentage.

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SECRET

9 Oct 1954 -- Sen. Mansfield debriefed on his recent trip to Indochina. He made an excellent presentation and was extremely helpful and well received. He informed me afterwards that he felt like an amateur amongst our professionals. He also expressed to me his current thinking of a Jt. Comm. He stated that he has assured the Rules Comm that in no wise did he desire to serve on such a comm, but sincerely felt that the comm was necessary as an assistance to CIA to prevent the wrong type of congressional interference. He added that he had considered as alternate possibilities:

- a. having the 4 members of the Senate and House leadership form a special CIA subcomm;
  - b. a special subcomm composed of probably 3 members each of the Senate and House Appro and AmrServ Comms, these members to be the ones that normally handled CIA affairs.--this is the one suggestion he now leans toward
-

SECRET

Pforzhemier Memo of Organization and Functions, Nov 1, 1954, w/  
tabs

shown to Red White and Gates--no indication of what came of this

very helpful-summary of dealings w/ 83rd Cong, 1953-54

includes much on general job description and funcs of office

*should be used in writing abt. Assumptions behind Cong-CIA Relationships  
functions of OLC*

*info on McCarthyism, Bundy, & Davies Affairs*

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**Page Denied**

SECRET

OLC Journal, 6 Jan 1955

Dulles and Pforzheimer call on Chairman Vinson of House ArmServComm. Also present was Mr. Smart, chief clerk of the comm.

Vinson indicated that he proposed to set up a special group consisting of hemslef and Congressmen Brooks, Kilday, Short, Arends, and Cole, and invite DCI up to discuss CIA w/ them. Vinson indicated that he felt "this was imp. in order to protect CIA, particularly on the Floor in case any Qs arose." Dulles concurs. Vinson did not appear to take kindly to certain proposals of Sen. Mansfield, but felt CIA was a produ ct of the ArmSErv comms and should remain so.

---

SECRET

3 Feb 1955 -- on 28 Jan, Sen. Russell, as chairman of Sen ArmServComm, designated himself as chairman and Sens. Byrd and Saltonstall as members of s special subcomm on CIA.

on Feb 3 Russell publicly announced this action, stating that a subcomm had been keeping a close check upon the operations and activities of CIA in the past, but that this action had n ot been publicized

[this is just at the time when Mansfield has introduced his resolution, and a no. of other similar proposals have been offered]

*4 Feb. 1955 - Bridges + LBJ have been added to CIA Subcomm*

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SECRET

8 Feb 1955 -- re resignation of P.M. Malenkov, HHH called for creation of a special Senate For Rel subcomm to keep abreast of latest info on Sov. strategy and criti-cized the admin's intell. facilities for not having advance indications of the shakeup in the Soviet premiership.

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UNCLASSIFIED

Pforzheimer Memo for DCI, 21 Feb 1955, Subj: House Appropriations Comm

suggests that in contrast to last yr's presentation, try to have CIA presentation to only part of the ARmServ Subcomm, rather than the full subcomm. - *they succeeded. only 5 congressmen were briefed*  
CIA should also try to limit no. of staffers, rather than last yr's 5.

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[redacted] (Chief, Budget Division, CIA) Memo for the Record, 21 March 1955,

SECRET

presentation of CIA budget for f.y. 56, before House Appropriations comm (5 members)

in asking abt reserve monies spent in last few yrs, versus money turned back to Treasury, Rep. Cannon indicated he was disappointed in CIA not spending more money than it had. Indicated that he feared steps which might provide advance warning of hostile acts might not have been taken even tho funds had been available. Added that CIA must take every step possible to strengthen the assets which wuld assure US of early warning of possible attack. [This shoots my theory re Cong. being concerned re saving money]

Does CIA need more money to do a better job?

but Mahon indicated "there was a growing restlessness concerning CIA in Cong and that many members were concerned abt the activities of CIA. Mr. Cannon indicated that the other members of the Appro Comm would not be authorized to obtain info abt the Agency. Mr. Mahon also indicated that he would like some personal confidence that CIA is cleaned up and that it is using its funds in an efficient and economical manner." How is CIA checked or audited?

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SECRET

OLC Journal

OLC Journal of 13 May 1955 mentions attacks made recently on CIA by Cong. Brownson

23 May 1955 -- WLP lunches w/ Brownson for 2 hrs. The entire conversation conducted "in a most friendly vein," and WLP believes he considerably relieved Brownson's concerns re appropriations, auditing practices, personnel management, contacts w/ the business community, security probs, and the need for a new HQ costing upwards of \$50 million.

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SECRET

16 May 1955 -- Sen. Symington lunched w/ DCI today. The senator was particularly interested in Sov. air developments, particularly in light of the admin's defense budget.

24 May 1955 -- Symington told WLP how enjoyable his lunch w/ DCI had been, and that he had been thinking that it would be helpful to have CIA testify of Sov airplane strength. I said I did not think we wished to get involved in the controversy, and he replied he was sure we did not and he had therefore suppressed his idea of having us called as witnesses.

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1.4. 1956

Approved For Release 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDP01-01773R000300030001-8

022-900041

SECRET

15 June 1955

Senate Apprs. Comm. approves CIA appropriation request w/out change -  
there were no hearings in the Senate this year

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SECRET

23 June 1955 -- Following testimony on appropriations for new HQ, Cong. Scrivner stated he was greatly disturbed by news reports on new Sov. bombers, particularly as the Comm had rec'd testimony 'from high mil. sources' that the Br. intell. on this matter was far superior to the Amer. He added that before we spent a lot more money on a physical plant, he would like to be assured of the merit of our intell. DCI refused to be drawn into a comparison of US and Br intell on this issue.

---

ECRET

20 July 1955 -- DCI concerned re the category in which DCI's and DDCI's salary will be placed in the proposed executive pay bill. Worried that salary will not be commensurate w/ ~~the~~ the position of the Agency in the govt.

28 July - House Comm on Post Office & Civil Service reports out H.R. 7219, the Federal Executive Pay Act of 1955. Placed the salary of DCI at \$22,000 yearly, comparable to Secretaries of Army, Navy & AF, & Director of FBI. Salary of DDCI established at \$20,000, together w/ Asst. Comptroller Gen., Dep. Dir. of BOB, Under Sec. of Army, Navy, & AF, & Deputy Under Sec. of State

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SECRET

8 Aug 1955 -- I invited Sen. Stennis to visit us at HQ to look us over and get the answers to some of the Qs he had raised in various hearings. He replied that he did not think he would come as he already had more work than he could handle and 'I am not going to tell you how to run your affairs.'

25 Oct - invitation for Stennis visiting CIA renewed & again turned down

UNCLASSIFIED

Pforzheimer Memorandum for Inspector General, 8 Sept 1955, Subj:  
Briefings of Congressmen by CIA, 1955

the following received briefings at CIA bet jan 1-Aug 31, 1955:

VP Nixon prior to trip to central Amer

Cong John W McCormack--general world probs at lunch

members of CIA Subcomm of Senate ArmSerComm--Russell, Saltonstall, Bridges

Sen. Anderson--atomic energy matters

Sen. Symington--May 16--Sov air developments discussed at lunch  
[is this imp. re bomber gap?]

4 others

Robert Kennedy, Counsel to Senate Investigations Subcomm

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**Page Denied**

UNCLASSIFIED

15-page questionnaire, enclosed in Dulles to Joeh E. Moss (House  
Comm on Government Operations), Oct 4, 1955

deals w/ the extent and procedures for sharing info w/ Cong--has  
info on staffing and duties of OLC

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SECRET

OLC Journal, 27 Oct 1955

re a Cong. manpower study--the subj not imp. But this document does indicate both the types of probs a secret intell organization does encaouter in an open society, and the way in which Cong, at least in early days, disposed to help CIA work around these probs

---

during mid-50s, Dulles usually lunched once a week w/  
key members of Congress

[ask Pfc. + others abt this]

---

DCI in 50s briefed JT Comm. on A Energy, <sup>usually turn</sup> ~~at least~~  
~~on~~ <sup>an</sup> go; on Sov. atomic e. developments

---

SECRET

chairmen of the House Appropriations Comm and the CIA subcomm:  
Clarence Cannon and John Taber  
chair of the Senate Appro Comm and the CIA subcomm: R. Russell,  
Carl Hayden, Leverrett Saltonstall, and Alexander Smith

The budget reviews before their committees were in executive ses-  
sion and any records were handled on a TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY  
basis. Usually, Agency's requests received only cursory  
examination. Dulles, w/ an appearance of candor, would  
give a "tour d'horizon" covering developments around the  
world. Memebbers would then ask Qs, few of which dealt w/  
internal Agency matters.

p. 102

For yrs, Clarence Cannon presided over the House Appropriations  
subcomm. Invariably, when he thought the proceedings had  
gone on long enuf, he would ask Dulles if he had enuf money  
to do his business properly. Dulles always allowed that  
he had asked for as much as he could wisely spend, promising  
to come back to the comm if he needed more. With that conciliatory not  
Cannon would then adjourn the meeting.

p. 103

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SECRET

Senate subcommittees not run quite as preemptorily as Cannon ran his in House, but in reviewing budgets for CIA, end result invariably the same.

Russell, Saltonstall, and Hayden were all good friends of Dulles, had confidence in him, and protected him from their colleagues.

Except in rare cases, hearings were in executive session, often w/out any committee staff members present.

On rare occasions, notably w/ respect for funds for the new building at Langley, CIA appropriations were handled w/ open hearings and a public record--that is, like ~~xxx~~ most other executive branch matters.

pp. 104-05

SECRET

Dulles--"a keen sensitivity to the vulnerabilities of a secret organization, a remarkable sense of public relations, and pol. skill."

p. 94

continually involved in making friends for the Agency. Vast number of friends and correspondents. His staff repeatedly protested that he saw too many visitors and made too many speeches, but he invariably answered that the public relations of the Agency required this.

p. 95

a master in the art of appearing to impart sensitive material w/out really compromising security

p. 96

or if he had some sensitive info to impart, he might ask his subordinates to w/draw, as if this were too hot even for their ears. Of course, they know all abt the item, but this invariably impressed the congressmen on the gravity of the info and made him a devoted supported of Dulles

p. 104

UNCLASSIFIED

Mass. Sen. Leverett Saltonstall, ranking member of both Armed Serv and Appro Committees, would later recall the subcomm. briefings: "Dominated by the Committee chairmen, members would ask few questions which dealt w/ internal Agency matters of w/ specific operations. The most sensitive discussions were reserved for one-to-one sessions bett Dulles and indiv. Committee chairmen."

p. 52

SECRET

why the harmonious relations w/ Cong in the 50s? the reputation of Dulles as a master intell operative, his transparent honesty and the regare in which he was widely held all contributed to allowing the Agency to develop, to make its mistakes and learn from them, w/ only a m inimum of outside interference

p. 147



UNCLASSIFIED

one former CIA official described Dulles's wooing of congressmen:  
"Allen used to find the congressmen were intrigued w/ little  
personality stories and quasi-clandestine details which would  
amuse [them]. But I think he found it an effective way of  
building a rapport w/ them. He was not fending them off parti-  
cularly, but giving them what they enjoyed and wanted."

p. 184-85

SECRET

constant and successful attention to Congress.  
Continued the practice initiated by Bedell Smith of inviting  
Congressmen to visit the Agency. Often briefed congressmen  
who were abt to go abroad and solicited thier observations upon  
their return.

his active social life led him into circles frequented by imp.  
congressment and particularly senators.

pp. 96-97

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**Page Denied**

CONFIDENTIAL

CIA Congressional Relations, 2nd Session, 84th Congress, no date, memo by Paul

DCI appeared once before each of the 2 ArmsSer subcomms on CIA to brief them on current operations and, in general terms, on proposed budget.

Appeared twice before House Appro Subcomm on CIA, chaired by Cannon, and once before Sen Appro Subcomm, chaired by Hayden, to discuss f.y. 1957 budget

budget approved in <sup>full</sup> ~~by~~ by comms and by the Cong

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INTERNAL USE ONLY

Norman Paul Memorandum for the Director, 29 Feb 1956, Subj: Congressional Contacts

recommends that DCI contact John McCormack soon becuz McCormack "appreciates being 'let in on things'"

recommends that DCI contact Rep. Francis W. Walter becuz Walter is the most powerful member of the House on all immigration matters many of which concern CIA directly

STAT

SECRET

OLC Journal, 17 Apr 1956

*prob. of keeping Cong. adequately informed*

*re last sentence: But while all agreed upon the inadequacy of the  
current methods, little was done to supplement them ~~was~~ for more than 10  
yrs.*

---

DCI appeared before Subcomm on the Air Force of the Senate ArmSer  
Comm, chaired by Sen Symington, re estimates of Rus air stringth, on  
18, 23, and 24 April 1956

at request of DCI, the comm published no part of the testimony of  
the DCI and his associates

---

prob. of security in what  
Cong can release

SECRET

Dulles to Symington, 8 May 1956

in connection w/ bomber gap hearings--the prob. of what info Cong.  
can release and attribute to DCI

*Symington then OKs this refusal, based exp. on the  
Recap of the last TP of 1st page*

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UNCLASSIFIED

Houston Memo for DCI, 9 May 56, Subj: Congressional Right to Executive Information

examines the right of Executive agencies to w/hold info from Cong-- in midst of dispute over whether Symington Comm. should publish testimony from DCI.

Houston argues that the Q has never been put to the final legal test, and that the prob is "primarily political rather than legal. . . . an Admin of any real strength can successfully refuse to honor requests from the Cong where it has a valid reason for such refusal based on some element of the nat. interest."

---

DECLASSIFIED (TS)

Memo for Gen. Bull, from Howard Stoertz, 31 May 56, Subj: Soviet Aircraft Production Estimates

since earlier in the yr, both ORR and Air Force have reevaluated their figures of Sov. heavy bomber production. ORR has made drastic changes in production estimates, AF relatively minor adjustments.

on Apr 23, Symington Comm was told by DCI that approx. 100 BISON had been produced thru 1 Apr 56. Air Force still accepts that no. but ORR now says it should be reduced to 41.

ORR's estimates adhere closely to what the hard evidence will support, while AF's figures adjust the hard evidence to estimated production capabilities and estimated mil. requirements.

the differences in these estimates are critical. Recommends that Symington Comm be informed that new evidence casts doubts on the figures it earlier heard from DCI

---

major controversy over Sov. capabilities w/ respect to long-range bombers in mid-50s. complicated by struggle bet. various branches of armed services for scarce defense dollars.

Air Force concluded that Rus. making substantial investment in intercontinental bombers--Navy and Army tended to Q Air Force figures.

Office of National Estimates produces its own assessment, lowering Air Force figures. ONE analysts maintained that production difficulties would mitigate vs. as large a bomber force as the Air Force credited the Soviets with.

p. 56

during Symington's airpower hearings in 1956, Dulles has at 1st refused to testify, then tried to halt prblication of evrn a censored version of his testimony.

but shortly afterwards, Dulles peared on TV and suggested that Khrushchev has exaggerated in claiming to have an operational ICBM--at which Sen. Henry Jackson roundly criticized him for saying on TV what he would not reveal before Cong.

p. 62

Henry Jackson, on Senate floor: re Dulles' statement "which implied that he had an evaluation of the Sov. equipment" [this is unclear--clarity comes below]: "I was very sorry to see that the head of the CIA discussed a subj. matter on a television program which he has said he would not discuss in public before a congressional committee."

Anderson of N.M.: "It certainly was my understanding that he did not wish to appear in an open session of the Jt. Comm on A. Energy, but preferred to be heard in private. We now find that it is quite permissible to appear on television---"

Jackson: if the news story and the TV program is correct, this would be "most unfortunate." "I think we should ask for a full and complete statement from Mr. Allen Dulles. Mr. Dulles has never made such a public statement heretofore."

apparently Dulles made several comments about the Sov ICBM program and the atomic power development program on TV.

p. 9441

Jackson: "What concerns me is not what was said, in so many words. What concerns me is that Mr. Dulles took the liberty to discuss these matters at all . . . in a television broadcast, when he has always declined to discuss such matters publicly before congressional committees. I thought his past policy was sound. I do not think the Director for the Cen Intell A should discuss matters

of the kind in public." p. 9442

by end of 1955, fears of a bomber gap began appearing in the press. Re heavy bombers capable of dropping ~~atomic~~ nuclear weapons on US cities.

scheduled to  
On Feb 24, 1956, Senate ArmSec & Comm hold hearings on the situation. Ike tried to head off such a hearing by asking for a supplemental appropriation for current fiscal yr to increase production of B-52s.

but Stuart Symington, a former Sec of the Air Force, and chair of the Subcomm on Air ~~Force~~ <sup>F. Lee</sup>, opened hearings on Apr 16, 1956.

during the hearings, Air Force officials, no doubt seeing a choice opportunity to expand their operating budget and to strengthen SAC, tended to give credence to the alarming predictions of Sov heavy bomber strength. The Air Force even ventured that by 1959, SAC would be but half the size of the Sov Long-Range Air Force.

during the hearings, SAC commander Gen. Curtis LeMay asserted the CIA agreed w/ Air Force projections, while Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Nathan Twining called for the formation of 6 more wings of B-52s. pp. 43-44

p. 1 of 3 pp.

P. 2 of 3 pp.

both Sec of Def. Charles Wilson and Army and Navy figures claimed that Air Force unduly alarmist re Sov. strength.

but bet. Ike's supplementary and the added increase approved by Cong in wake of the Symington hearings, Air Force budget grew by almost a billion \$ (\$928.5 m).

p. 44

in Aug. 1956, a new NIE supported the Air Force in these high figures of Sov. strength, setting current Sov strength at 65 bombers (35 Bison and 30 Bear) and predicting 470 by middle of 1958 and 800 by mid-1960. But Army G-2 formally ~~by mid-1960~~ <sup>> NC</sup> dissented from these estimates, and CIA, hoping to reestab. harmony among the various intell. groupings, set to work on its own estimates.

ORR analysts soon began to argue that even if USSR were somehow able to build as many bombers as AF was predicting, Sov's limited industrial base would not be able to provide the supporting forces and facilities required by such a large force.

pp. 45-46

p. 3 of 3 pp.

meanwhile, other doubts being thrown on AF figures. ONE questioned whether Sov. able to produce the heavy bombers as quickly as had been earlier estimated. and new evidence suggested that the performance capabilities of the Bison might not be nearly as advanced as earlier estimated, leading to Qs whether the USSR would want to deploy such a large force of these aircraft. plus U-2 evidence on one of the early flights argued vs. the Air Force figures

so revision of the NIE on Russian bomber strength began in Dec. 1956. Early in the following yr., Dulles able to assure Ike that AF figures heavily inflated. AF Sec. Donald Quarles admitted as much in cong. testimony in Feb 1957.

an angry Stuart Symington wrote to Dulles protesting the lowered estimates, but Dulles replied that the press reports abt the lower estimates substantially correct.

pp. 46-47



BISON, heavy jet bomber - similar to an B-52, but qualitatively  
inferior

BEAR - heavy turboprop bomber - for greater range than BISON - a  
modern, high performance airplane, also inferior to an B-52

---

Sherman Kent Memo for DCI, 2 July 1956, Subj: Soviet Heavy Bomber Problem

"this will summarize the latest developments in a prob which relates to your April testimony before the Symington Comm, and to your possible obligation to bring that testimony up to date."

memo then goes on to summarize developments bet Apr and July. What is imp. is the 2nd half of the quoted sentence above.

Gen. LeMay later testified in ope session that current Sov strength in BISONs was larger than US strength in B-52s, and that if heavy bomber production proceeded at rates estimated for USSR and planned for US, by mid-1959 USSR would have a substantially larger force of heavy bombers than US would then have. "This has been a major pt. in the Comm's argument that US production must be stepped up."

---

TOP SECRET

Memo for Mr. Paul, from Howard Stoertz, 2 Nov 1956, Subj: Symington  
Comm, follow-up question on BEAR production

highlights the downward revision of BEAR and BISON strength bet Dulles's  
testimony in Apr 1956 and the NIE of Aug. 1956

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SECRET

OLC Journal, 26 Nov 1956

DCI, plus Amory and Paul, *Chair, JCS* briefed House For Aff Comm, along w/ Acting Sec. Hoover, Adm Radford, and Arthur Flemming *(Office of Def. Mobilization)*. The questioning was not hostile insofar as intell was concerned, w/ the exception of Mrs. Kelly who cited a NYT article implying Rus had better advance intell on Mid East hostilities than did US. No transcript made.

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Norman Paul Memo of Meeting, 9 Jan 1957

SECRET

*note - Ranging disc. of Carl Vinson (House ArmSer)*

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Feb 25, 1957

Symington called Dulles to complain of press reports of a downward revision of intell. estimates on Sov heavy bomber production. the Sen. wanted to know why this revised estimate had not been communicated to him or to his Subcomm. Dulles said he thought this info had been give to the Subcomm, but that he would check further.

*[Apparently CIA made 2 mistakes - not letting Subcomm. know of its new figures soon enough, + when it did pass the new figures along (Nov. 5), not doing it forcefully enough]*

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DECLASSIFIED (TS)

Sherman Kent Memo for the Director, 11 Mar 57

NIEs of May 1955 and March 1956 estimated that Rus had abt. 40 Bison jet heavy bombers in operational units on 1 Jan 56, and that it would probably have abt 80 in operational units on 1 July 56.

NIE 11-4-56, of Aug 1956, downgraded these estimates. Said Rus had abt 35 Bisons in operational units, rather than the 80 earlier estimated.

This lowered estimate due in part to production difficulties.

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DECLASSIFIED (TS)

Sherman Kent Memo for DCI, 11 Mar 57

Dulles testifies before Symington Comm on ~~18-24~~ <sup>18, 23, + 24</sup> Apr 1956. Says that BISON strength estimated at abt 45 ~~units~~ in units as of 1 Apr 56, ~~and~~  
~~projects~~

Gen. Watson (?) ~~testifies~~ <sup>testifies</sup> that based on estimated production rate, 101 BISONs had been produced by 1 Apr 56. Dulles concurs with this general range, tho adds data not lend itself to such a specific number.

*Air Force intell.*

*p 1 of 4 pp.*



TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Huntington Sheldon (Acting DD/I), Memo for DCI, 7 Mar 1957, Subj:  
Downward Revision of Estimates of Soviet BISON Strength

Dulles testified before Symington Comm re Sov heavy bomber strength in Apr 1956--his testimony based on the May 1955 estimate. Then, almost immediately after his sessions w/ the Symington Comm, indications started coming in that these nos. were inflated.

In June 1956, CIA challenged the estimate that 80 BISONs would be in units by 1 July, and NIE 11-4-56, then in draft, was held up until AIR Force could make its own re-check. The end result was NIE 11-4-56 of Aug. 2, 1956

p. 2 of 4 pp.

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DECLASSIFIED (TS)

Sherman Kent Memo for DCI, 11 Mar 57

on June 29, 1956, Congress approves Air Force appropriation, including \$6.8 billion for procurement of aircraft and related items. Sens Symington, Jackson, Russell, and Robertson leading spokesmen for the increased Air Force figure, and all made frequent reference on floor to fact that US falling behind Rus in heavy jet bomber strength.

but at precisely this moment, CIA having 2nd thoughts re Sov. strength. Three days after the Cong. vote, AD/NE Kent sent memo to DCI calling attention to these doubts and to possible obligation to bring Symington Comm testimony up to date.

on July 19, 1956, Gen. Twining, freshly back from trip to USSR, appears before Symington Comm and refers to latest agreed national estimate on Sov bomber strength as that of 1 Apr 1956--that is, he gives no evidence that these figures may be severely inflated. This is the last hearing of the Symington Comm.

p 3 of 4 pp

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DECLASSIFIED (TS)

Sherman Kent Memo for DCI, 11 Mar 57

Cong adjourns shortly before Aug. 56 revision of Sov heavy bomber strength. Not until Nov. 5 does anyone do anything. On that date, CIA legislative counsel handcarries memo to Symington Comm Counsel Edward Welsh giving new figures on BISON AND BEAR strength.

but on 30 Jan 1957, Symington Comm report released, tho DCI's testimony not published, as per original agreement

a week earlier, on 23 Jan, DCI had given new figures in testimony to Jt Comm on A Energy, tho Symington Comm report continued to use old figures.

*p 4 of 4 pp*

Job 60-321, box 1

OLC Journal, 26 Feb 1957

OLC reminds Welsh of Nov 5 memo mentioned above. Welsh did not immediately remember this memo and evidently had not shown it to Symington

---

Dulles to Symington, 18 Mar 1957

Dulles and Symington talked on phone yesterday, Mar. 17, in which Symington asks for further info on NIE changes in Sov heavy bomber strength, and also mentions the newspaper publicity over this in recent weeks.

Dulles reminds the senator of the Nov. 5 meeting in which the new figures were delivered.  
also notes that the new figures do not change the estimated no. of modern bombers which USSR likely to develop over next few yrs.

Symington to Dulles, also of 18 Mar, 1957

suggests that except for this recent episode, CIA has always underestimated Sov production of weapons.  
Dulles replies on Apr 4 that this is not correct.

UNCLASSIFIED

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(including Whitten & other members of Appr. Comm.)

Some Congressmen came to believe that the alarmist figures of Apr. '56 purposefully inflated to scare Cong. into larger appropriations.

On the other hand, conservatives such as Stewart Alsop [Ch. DC Post & Times Herald, Mar. 10, 57, p. E5] say the latter demand revisions result from admin. pressure to hold down govt. expenses.

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UNCLASSIFIED

Draft letter, Dulles to Thomas S. Gordon, 21 March 1957

letter never sent.

refuses to meet w/ House For Aff Comm, for fear of establishing precedent re meeting w/ cong. comms other than those designated for oversight.

[I will want to ask abt. this. Only 4 months earlier, on Nov 26, 1956, DCI met w/ this same comm]

UNCLASSIFIED

Paul Memo for the Director, 22 Mar 1957, Subj: Congressional  
Remarks on Hungary

refers to speeches on House floor on Mar 18--should check in Cong  
Rec and cite this if possible

John McCormack, normally a friend of CIA, in speaking of US surprise  
at turn of events in Hungary in early Nov and late Oct., asks how  
US intell could have estimated that all was quiet behind the Iron  
Curtain during this time. The Hungarian revolt has revealed "the  
cold fact that our intell system has fallen into disrepair and that  
intell data is being manufactured to support conclusions arrived  
at by a group of immature theorists."

---

Cong. Rec., 27 May 1957

Rep. Sikes : "I am disturbed about the cost of the CIA. . . . I seriously question that it is earning its keep."

p. 6898

[chk. this before using]

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following Sputnik in early Oct 1957, LBJ's Preparedness Investigating Subcomm of the Senate ArmSer Comm held new hearings at end of 1957 and early '58.

prior to CIA testimony, Karl Weber, deputy director of the OSI, took CIA info to subcomm. offices w/ offer that LBJ could cite it in open session or read from it as the formal CIA opinion. But Dulles would appear only in executive session, from which no testimony would be released. Issue remained unresolved.

Dulles and OSI Director Hervert Scoville testified. As the subcomm. staffers has wished, a press release of Dulles' testimony later issue, tho w/ info on Sov ICBMs and IRBMs deleted.

p. 65

*Dulles stated that intell. community had some time earlier pressed a Sov. capacity for orbiting earth satellites during '57 - he then reviewed Sov. IRBM program & analyzed the implications of the 2 Sov. ICBM tests in the summer of 1957*

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*p. 65*

Symington very upset w/ what he saw as Eisenhower admin's lack of concern over Sov missile threat. in 1958, following CIA briefing of Sen. ArmServ kComm re Sov missiles, Sumington went to White House to complain that CIA figures too low. It was widely believed that Symington was being fed higher figures by Air Force.

At Ike's suggestion, Symington went to meet w/ the Board of Nat. Estimates at the CIA, the 1st legislator to do so on official business. But BNE still did not satisfy the senator.

↓ when the Dec 1958 NIE came in (a few months later) w/ a further reduction in Sov ICBM estimates, Symington still more upset.

p. 83

1958 legislation

PL 85-507, the Government Employees Training Act--approved by Ike on 7 July 1958--repealed Sec. 4 of CIA Act of 1949

the act in its final form passed w/out approval of, or consultation w/ CIA, and after CIA had strenuously objected to other bills seeking to repeal Sec 4 in past yrs.

Sec 4 pertained to Agency officers being assigned to special training

CONFIDENTIAL

Memo for the Record, by [redacted] (Exec Officer), 21 Oct 1958,  
Subj: Mr. Robert W. Smart

25X1

[this is in reference to Smart's Aug. trip to Eur, where [redacted]  
[redacted] failed to brief him as had been planned]

25X1

25X1

DCI calls Smart himself to apologize.

Apparatnetly the Air Force officer responsible for overseeing  
Smart's and Blandford's trip had told the CIA briefer that Smart  
and Blandford would be unable to be briefed since they had a full  
schedule.

Smart very appreciative of DCI's call. Said he was no "prima  
donna" and that he hoped no disciplinary action would be taken

SECRET

JOHN Warner Memo for Executive Officer, 28 Oct 1958, Subj:  
Luncheon Meeting w/ Robert Smart, Chief Counsel, House Armed  
Services Comm

[in Aug Smart had been promised a briefing [ ] but the CIA  
contact had failed to show up. This caused quite a flap for  
Warner's office, and DCI himself had gotten involved.]

25X1

now Warner is urging Exec Office- to get DCI to invite Smart  
to lunch--Warner suggests a guest list of DCI, Gen. Cabell,  
Kirkpatrick, Col. White, Mr. Amory, either Mr. Helms or Kara-  
messines, Smart, and Warner--in other words, almost all the  
hotshots for one cong. staffer

*[This lunch (with ~~at~~ apparently most or all of the guests above) was held on Oct. 31  
Supplement to OLC Journal, 31 Oct 58 - same file: guests were:  
DCI, DDCI, Gen. Tammott, Col. White, Helms, Albert Smith, &  
Warner*

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new NIE in Dec 1959, for use w/ the f.y. 1961 budget hearings. this new estimate, and similar evaluations from the Pentagon, downgraded the Sov threat and infuriated ~~xxxx~~ some in Cong and the press who worried that the admin had juggled the figures for pol or budgetary purposes.

LBJ, then running for the Demo pres. nomination, called new hearings on missiles and space programs. Mo. Sen. Stuary Symington, a hardliner and w/ gr prestige becuz of his earlier service as Air Force Sec under HST, also running for Pres.

SAC chief making inflammatory speeches, while Air Force intelligence publically admitted it had dissented from NIE becuz it believed Sov has a larger no. of ICBMs than the NIE had projected.

Dulles called twice to testify. The 2nd session, on Feb 25, 1960, was a 5 hr, closed door session, but Senate still not satisfied w/ the estimates.

pp. 90-94

May 9, 1960 - NASA weather plane story rapidly disintegrating. Dulles +  
Harten meet w/ 18 cong. leaders to explain the true story

p. 100

SECRET

Clarence Cannon--chair of House Comm on Appro.  
when Cannon heard public news of loss of U-2, he angrily  
telephoned Dulles and demanded to know why he had not been  
previously told of this operation. Dulles assured him that  
he had been told. Cannon then wrote out the following  
statement and delivered it on House floor: "The plane was  
on an espionage mission authorized and supported by money  
provided under an appropriation recommended by the House  
Committee on Appropriations and passed by the Congress."

p. 129





Sen For Rel Comm held hearings into CIA acativities  
following U-2 incident in 1960 and Bay of Pigs in 1961

TOP SECRET

Houston Memo for the Record, 27 April 1961, Subj: Briefing  
of the CIA Subcomm of House Armed Services on Cuba

LOGC job # - given to be by

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STAT

Apr 20, 1961 -- CIA Subcomm of House Appro Comm briefed on situation  
in C uba

Apr 24, 1961 -- CIA Subcomm of House ArmSerComm briefed on Cuba

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be certain to see Col. White's diary entry for  
30 June 1961.

contains useful info re Agency's perspective of the value of cong.  
briefings

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